



How Attackers (Really) Advance: Unveiling 11 Real-Life Stories



Guide





Attackers don't think like you do.

When they look at your environment, they are searching for ways to bypass your security controls and take advantage of various exposures that exist in your environment. They're not just looking for vulnerabilities, they're on the hunt for a combination of exposures and attack techniques that could help them reach their target.

But what happens once they get their initial foothold?

Well, that depends on the exploitable attack paths available to them. Certain exposures on their own, aren't capable of being leveraged in any significant way by attackers. But attackers don't look at the individual exposure – instead they leverage a combination of

vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, overly permissive identities, and other security gaps to move across systems and reach sensitive assets.


This allows them to cause significant and ongoing damage while hiding inside networks.

In this ebook, we will take you through the 11 most potent real-life attack path scenarios our in-house experts found in customers' hybrid environments using XM Cyber's Exposure Management Platform. Studying the construct of attack paths enables a better understanding of how the attacks could have occurred – and importantly, how to prevent similar attacks down the road.

So now, without further ado, let's allow the experts and their stories to speak for themselves.

The Shipping M&A vs The ZeroLogon Patch That Didn't *Quite* Update

Rinat Villeval, Head of Technical Services



Who was the customer?

A large shipping company that had just bought three different companies; one in the USA, one in Asia, and one in South Africa.

What was the scenario?

Routine customer call.

What was the attack path?

We showed them the Active Directory located in Asia had a high risk score, and could be **compromised in just two steps**. It turned out that the **ZeroLogon patch was missing** because though they had patched it, it did not reboot. In fact, their vulnerability scanner said it was safe but **it hadn't been applied and the DLL version was still the previous one**.

The outbound attack path from that remote active directory was compromising all the other active directories in the organization, as trust had already been established as part of the M&A process.

What was the impact?

Any attacker could have easily compromised the entire Active Directory Forest, leading from one company to all others.

How was it remediated?

Amazingly, a small fix was able to reduce a big exposure. All they had to do was reboot the active directory and then the DLL version was updated.

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The Man-in-the Middle at The Insurance Company

Alexei Rubenstein, VP Sales Engineering



Who was the customer?

A large insurance company.

What was the scenario?

Routine customer call.

What was the attack path?

A small subset of machines was sending out **DHCP v6 broadcasts**, enabling an attacker to position themselves as a **Man-in-the-Middle** to exploit a Windows update vulnerability on that system. One of those systems was a developer's machine with **several private SSH keys unprotected in their downloads folders**. Using those SSH keys, an **attacker would've been able to easily compromise around 200 Linux systems** within their on-premise datacenter and in their cloud environment.

What was the impact?

This could have allowed a large majority of their Linux servers to be compromised. From those systems, the attacker could have carried out additional attacks, encrypted systems/data for ransom, or exfiltrated data.


How was it remediated?

By disabling DHCPv6 and patching the developer's machine, both the vulnerability and misconfiguration were addressed. It was also a good time to review best practices with the developers to make them aware of the SSH keys putting their Linux systems at risk, to limit future risk.

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They've Needed a Good Vacation Since 2017

Matt Quinn, Technical Director



Who was the customer?

A large travel company that does getaway bookings.

What was the scenario?

They had just merged with another company in the same industry and brought their infrastructure across.

What was the attack path?

They had a server for product testing which was always running and wasn't particularly important. They thought they were patching, but in reality, **patches had not applied correctly since 2017!** So they had a huge list of vulnerabilities on the server, including PrintNightmare and EternalBlue. And while an attack could compromise this unimportant server, it would have provided a path to move on to MUCH more important ones.

What was the impact?

When they actually looked at the server, they realized they didn't even need it – so they just turned it off!


How was it remediated?

Simply turning it off had a huge impact on reducing risk to the rest of the environment.

When they actually looked at the server, they realized they didn't even need it – so they just turned it off!

The Bank and The Complicated – Yet Plausible and Potent – Attack Path

Shahar Solomon, Partner Success Director



Who was the customer?

A global financial institution.

What was the scenario?

Routine customer call.

What was the attack path?

We identified an **automation using a service account** which had initiated an action based on SMB port. This could **risk credentials** from this service account to be used for a **Man-in-the-Middle** attack inside the network, which would allow an attacker to laterally **move to another device/workstation** in the network. Next, we found **SSH private keys to a server running on an EC2**

instance (AWS). Attached to this EC2 was an IAM role, and using its permissions it was possible to **spin up a new EC2**. Finally, this could be used to compromise one of **their most critical assets**, used for deployment in the customer environment.

What was the impact?

Although it's a bit of a complex path, it's very potent – and if the wrong entities were to locate it, it could be a disaster.


How was it remediated?

They immediately remediated each part of the attack path by removing private SSH keys, resetting IAM role permissions, and removing specific users.

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This is Why Nobody Takes the Bus Anymore

Konrad Haag, Customer Success Manager



Who was the customer?

A public transportation company.

What was the scenario?

They had recently onboarded to the system and we were having a meeting to get them set up.

What was the attack path?

We uncovered an **open path from a DMZ server** (directly reachable over the internet), that could directly lead to the domain compromise. The DMZ server is a Windows server, which **was joined to the customer's Windows domain** and administered with a domain admin account.

What was the impact?

If the DMZ server were to be compromised, the attacker could directly harvest domain admin credentials and connect to the domain controller with all permissions.


How was it remediated?

They fixed the issue by restricting permissions and removing users.

If the DMZ server were to be compromised, the attacker could directly harvest domain admin credentials and connect to the domain controller with all permissions.

The Hospital Where Active Directory Was Making it Sick

Gil Graff, Security Posture Product Director



Who was the customer?

A hospital that has very good security hygiene and cares deeply about ensuring best practices.

What was the scenario?

Routine customer call.

What was the attack path?

Despite the fact that security really is of prime importance, their Active Directory was another story. Inside their AD, **all authenticated users (basically any user) in the domain had been erroneously granted the right to reset passwords!**

What was the impact?

So if an attacker took over one Active Directory user via phishing or other social engineering techniques, they could then reset any passwords for other users and take over any account in the domain.

How was it remediated?

They locked down and hardened their Active Directory security practices and put a remediation plan into place which covers analysis of critical assets at risk, their choke points, and the attack techniques that could be leveraged.

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That Time the Financial Giant Thought the Patch was Deployed, but ...

Boaz Gorodissky, CTO & Co-Founder



Who was the customer?

A major player in the financial services industry.

What was the scenario?

Routine customer call.

What was the attack path?

As part of Patch Tuesday, they had **tried to patch all servers using SCCM**. This included the patch for the **ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472)** vulnerability on the domain controllers. The domain controllers are very sensitive and mission critical, so **not all were rebooted after the patch update**.

What was the impact?

Essentially, the patch was deployed but not installed, leaving an open avenue that attackers could use to compromise the domain controllers.


How was it remediated?

As soon as we showed them the issue, they changed their procedures to ensure that in the future, they'll never forget to reboot after patching.

The patch was deployed but not installed, leaving an open avenue that attackers could use to compromise the domain controllers.

The Healthcare Provider Where Anyone Could be a Domain Admin

Gali Rahamim, Customer Onboarding Manager



Who was the customer?

A large healthcare provider.

What was the scenario?

Routine customer call.

What was the attack path?

The Authenticated Users group is a built-in (predefined) Windows group that **includes all users whose identities were authenticated when they logged on**. We found an attack path using the authenticated users group with permissions to **change the GPO policy's gPCFileSysPath to a path with malicious policies**. One of the affected objects was the **AD Users Container**, with a child object

that's a user who's part of the Domain Admin group. So any user in the domain could gain Domain Admin permissions – all an attacker needed was **one non-privileged user to click on a phishing campaign to compromise the entire domain**.

What was the impact?

The impact could have been a complete compromise of their domain.

How was it remediated?

Luckily, we were able to have it remediated by removing permissions to modify the path before any damage was done.



The impact could have been a complete compromise of their domain.

Driverless (and Dangerous) Vehicles are Coming!

Tobi Traebing, Director of Sales Engineering & Field CTO, EMEA



Who was the customer?

A large manufacturer in EMEA.

What was the scenario?

They had a vulnerability management solution in place, some hardening done, but were overwhelmed by the sheer amount of work. As in any industrial setting, heavy goods were being transported from place to place and they used unmanned vehicles to transfer the goods. We were having a POC with them.

What was the attack path?

This deployment included a **server responsible for controlling uncrewed/unmanned vehicles** that were transporting goods in the factory.

We located an attack path that would **allow an attacker to gain control of the vehicles** using a software vulnerability that could be exploited from asset #1 to asset #2. Then the attacker would be able to **harvest credentials to compromise** User A. Lastly, the **compromised user could be used to login on to the critical asset**.

What was the impact?

If an attacker got access, they'd be able to gain control of the vehicles and cause physical harm and damage – that means IT Security could have a direct impact on the safety of personnel.


How was it remediated?

They quickly realized that they needed to get a deeper understanding of their networks and created plans to onboard attack path modeling tools.

If an attacker got access, they'd be able to gain control of the vehicles and cause physical harm and damage.

The Telecom Giant and the Credential Dump that Should have Never Been

Sascha Merberg, Technical Director



Who was the customer?

An enterprise with many subsidiaries in the telecom industry.

What was the scenario?

Routine customer call.

What was the attack path?

They had **one admin account** for an elite group of systems that was **using one account per admin**, which they used for everything – domain admin, installing software, administering databases – truly everything. From any client machine that had been logged into, and used by the admin, we were able to **dump credentials** and move quickly laterally through the domain controller and **show how the whole domain could be compromised**.

What was the impact?

Interestingly, they already had an initiative to change this – they wanted to introduce new accounts for admins and hardware tokens for authentication to prevent cached credentials – but the project got put on the back burner. This enabled them to go to management and show the urgency, helping it to be prioritized.


How was it remediated?

They removed risky credentials, and re-established best practices for implementing best practices when creating roles and permissions.

This enabled them to go to management and show the urgency, helping it to be prioritized.

Now You Know Why Your Package Never Made its Way to You

Zur Ulianitzky, SVP Product and Security Research



Who was the customer?

A major shipping and logistics company.

What was the scenario?

Routine customer call.

What was the attack path?

The attack path started from a random workstation machine **in the on-prem environment**. After exploiting some credentials issues in the enterprise environment, **we were able to pivot into the cloud** (Azure environment) by **harvesting valid Azure access tokens** (claimed with MFA). Once the Azure recon phase was completed, we were able to **escalate our privileges**, and finally compromise

an Intune (Azure MDM solution for managing devices)

Administrator user. By abusing the permissions of that user, we could **execute code back on enterprise machines** which he managed.

What was the impact?

Continued lateral movement would have led to the compromise of the entire enterprise environment.

How was it remediated?

There were more users than expected with the Intune Administrator role so we removed all irrelevant users and remediated the problem. If it had not been remediated, this could have allowed any attacker to get control over their entire environment.

Continued lateral movement would have led to the compromise of the entire enterprise environment.



The Big Takeaway

Understanding attack paths allows organizations to pinpoint the most critical exposures. It's about spotlighting the real threats and deciding which ones to tackle first based on their potential impact.

You may be familiar with the Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) framework, a proactive and continuous five-stage program that helps organizations monitor, evaluate, and reduce their level of exploitability and validate that their analysis and remediation processes are optimal. Within the context of CTEM, attack paths help us map out attackers' moves and identify key points to block them.

By zeroing in on attack paths, organizations can realize the full promise of CTEM. Seeing the potential paths an attacker may take helps organizations understand the specific sequences of steps that could be used to compromise assets. By mapping out these attack paths and identifying what we call "choke points" (from which attacks can be easily and effectively blocked), we can prioritize exposures based on the actual potential impact of a breach.

Want to learn more about attack paths and how XM Cyber can help your organization improve security posture and reduce risk? Grab a demo slot today!



XM Cyber is a leading Continuous Exposure Management company that transforms the way organizations approach cyber risk, enabling security teams to prevent more attacks with 75% less remediation effort. Its XM Attack Graph Analysis™ capability discovers CVEs, misconfigurations, and identity issues across on-premise and all major cloud environments. It analyzes how attackers can chain exposures together to reach critical assets, identifies key "choke points", and provides remediation guidance. Founded by top executives from the Israeli cyber intelligence community, XM Cyber has offices in North America, Europe, APAC-Japan, and Israel.